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Abstract. We consider a class of optimization problems with Cartesian variational inequality
(CVI) constraints, where the objective function is convex and the CVI is associated with a
monotone mapping and a convex Cartesian product set. This mathematical formulation captures a
wide range of optimization problems including those complicated by the presence of equilibrium
constraints, complementarity constraints, or an inner-level large scale optimization problem. In
particular, an important motivating application arises from the notion of efficiency estimation of
equilibria in multi-agent networks, e.g., communication networks and power systems. In the
literature, the iteration complexity of the existing solution methods for optimization problems with
CVI constraints appears to be unknown. To address this shortcoming, we develop a first-order
method called averaging randomized block iteratively regularized gradient (aRB-IRG). The main
contributions include: (i) In the case where the associated set of the CVI is bounded and the
objective function is nondifferentiable and convex, we derive new non-asymptotic suboptimality
and infeasibility convergence rate statements. Importantly, this paper appears to be the first work
to provide these rate guarantees for this class of problems. (ii) In the case where the CVI set is
unbounded and the objective function is smooth and strongly convex, utilizing the properties of the
Tikhonov trajectory, we establish the global convergence of aRB-IRG in an almost sure and a mean
sense. We provide the numerical experiments for solving the problem of selecting the best Nash
equilibrium in a networked Cournot competition model.
Key words. first-order methods, variational inequalities, complexity analysis, efficiency of Nash
equilibria, iterative regularization, randomized block-coordinate
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1. Introduction. Traditionally, the mathematical models and algorithms for
constrained optimization have been much focused on the cases where the functional
constraints are in the form of inequalities, equalities, or easy-to-project sets. However,
in a breadth of emerging applications in the control theory and economics, the system
constraints are too complex to be characterized in those forms. This may arise in
several network application domains where the optimization model is complicated by
the presence of equilibrium constraints, complementarity constraints, or an inner-level
large scale optimization problem. Accordingly, the goal in this paper lies in addressing
the following constrained optimization problem:
(PfVI)
minimize f(x)
subject to x ∈ SOL(X,F ).
Here, f : Rn → R is a convex function and X ⊆ Rn is given as a Cartesian product,
i.e., X ,
∏d
i=1Xi, where Xi ⊆ Rni is convex for all i = 1, . . . , d and
∑d
i=1 ni = n. We
consider F : X → Rn to be a monotone mapping. The term SOL(X,F ) denotes the
solution set of the variational inequality VI(X,F ) defined as follows: A vector x ∈ X
is said to be a solution to VI(X,F ) if for any y ∈ X, we have F (x)T (y − x) ≥ 0.
Variational inequalities, first introduced in late 1950s, are an immensely powerful
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mathematical tool that can serve as a unifying framework for capturing a wide range of
applications arising in operations research, finance, and economics (cf. [12, 34, 10, 44]).
Importantly, as it will be discussed shortly, the block structure of the set X allows
for addressing Nash games as well as high-dimensional optimization problems. We
note that the problem (PfVI) can represent a variety of the standard problems in
optimization and VI regimes. For example, when F (x) := 0n, the problem (P
f
VI) is
equivalent to the canonical optimization problem minx∈X f(x). Also, when f(x) := 0,
the problem (PfVI) is equivalent to solving VI(X,F ). More detailed examples that can
be reformulated as the problem (PfVI) are presented below.
1.1. Motivating examples.
Example 1.1 (Efficiency estimation of equilibria). The main motivating
application arises from the notion of efficiency of equilibria in multi-agent networks,
including communication networks and power systems. In the noncooperative
regimes, the system behavior is governed by a collection of decisions (i.e.,
equilibrium) made by a set of independent and self-interested agents. As a result of
this noncooperative behavior (i.e., game) among the agents, the global performance
of the system may become worse than the case where the agents cooperatively seek
an optimal decision. A well-known example is the Prisoners’ Dilemma where the
costs of the players incurred by the Nash equilibrium are superior to their costs
when they cooperate [31]. Indeed, it has been well-received in economics and
computer science communities that Nash equilibria of a game may not attain full
efficiency. This perception has led to a surge of research for understanding the
quality of an equilibrium in noncooperative games. In particular, addressing this
question becomes imperative for network design [4] in the areas of routing [9] and
load balancing [35]. In such networks, a protocol designer seeks the best equilibrium
with respect to a global performance measure, i.e., the function f in (PfVI). To this
end, the notion of price of stability is defined as the ratio of the best objective
function value over the set of equilibria to the best objective function value under no
competition [30]. In regard to the choice of the objective function f in (PfVI),
different approaches have been considered, including the utilitarian function and the
egalitarian function [30]. In the utilitarian approach, f is defined as the summation
of the individual objective functions of the agents, while in the egalitarian approach,
the maximum of the individual cost functions is considered. In the context of
network resource allocation where a monetary value is measured, the utilitarian
approach is also referred to as Marshallian aggregate surplus (e.g., see [17]). In the
following, we describe the details for the problem of selecting the best equilibrium in
Nash games, where we employ the utilitarian approach. Consider a canonical Nash
game among d players where the ith player is associated with a strategy
x(i) ∈ Xi ⊆ Rni and a cost function gi
(
x(i);x(−i)
)
, where x(−i) denotes the
collection of actions of other players. Nash games arise in a wide range of problems
including communication networks [1, 2, 46], cognitive radio networks [43, 39, 25],
and power markets [20, 21, 41]. The game is defined formally as the following
collection of problems for all i = 1, . . . , d:
minimizex(i) gi
(
x(i);x(−i)
)
Pi
(
x(−i)
)
subject to x(i) ∈ Xi.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a tuple of strategies x∗ ,
(
x∗(1);x∗(2); . . . ;x∗(d)
)
where
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no player can obtain a lower cost by deviating from his own strategy, given that the
strategies of the other players remain unchanged. It is known that (cf. Proposition
1.4.2 [12]) when for all i, Xi is a closed convex set and gi is a differentiable convex
function with respect to x(i), the resulting equilibrium conditions of the Nash game
given by (Pi
(
x(−i)
)
), are compactly captured by a Cartesian VI(X,F ) where X ,∏d
i=1Xi and F (x) , (F1(x); . . . ;Fd(x)) with Fi(x) , ∇x(i)gi
(
x(i);x(−i)
)
. The set
SOL(X,F ) will then represent the set of Nash equilibria to the game (Pi
(
x(−i)
)
).
The best NE problem employing the utilitarian approach is formulated as follows:
(1.1)
minimize
d∑
i=1
gi
(
x(i);x(−i)
)
subject to x ∈ SOL
(
d∏
i=1
Xi,
(
∇x(1)g1
(
x(1);x(−1)
)
; . . . ;∇x(d)gd
(
x(d);x(−d)
)))
.
In section 5, we solve the model (1.1) for a class of networked Nash-Cournot games.
Example 1.2 (High-dimensional constrained convex optimization). Another class
of problems that can be captured by the model (PfVI) is as follows:
(1.2)
minimize f(x)
subject to hj(x) ≤ 0 for all j = 1, . . . , J
Ax = b, x ∈ X ,
∏d
i=1
Xi,
where x ∈ Rn, A ∈ Rm×n, b ∈ Rm, hj : Rn → R for all j, and n is possibly very large.
In the following, we show a case where the problem (1.2) can be cast as (PfVI):
Lemma 1.3. Let the problem (1.2) be feasible and hj(x) be a continuously
differentiable convex function for all j. Let the set Xi ∈ Rni be nonempty, closed,
and convex for all i. Then, the problem (1.2) is equivalent to (PfVI) where
F : Rn → Rn is defined as F (x) , AT (Ax− b) +∑Jj=1 max{0, hj(x)}∇hj(x).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Example 1.4 (Optimization problems with complementarity constraints).
Another class of problems that can be addressed in this work is as follows:
(1.3)
minimize f(x)
subject to xTF (x) = 0, x ≥ 0, F (x) ≥ 0,
where F : Rn → Rn is a mapping. Then, problem (1.3) can be cast as (PfVI) where
the set X is the nonnegative orthant, i.e., X , Rn+ (see Proposition 1.1.3 in [12]).
Example 1.5 (Optimization problems with nonlinear equality constraints).
Consider the following optimization problem:
(1.4)
minimize f(x)
subject to F (x) = 0.
where F : Rn → Rn is a mapping. Defining X , Rn, SOL(X,F ) is equal to the
feasible solution set of the problem (1.4). This implies that the problem (1.4) can be
captured by the formulation (PfVI).
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1.2. Existing methods and the research gap. We first begin by providing
a brief overview of the solution methods for addressing a VI problem. Starting from
the seminal work of Lemke and Howson [27] and Scarf [37], who developed the first
solution methods for computing equilibria, in the past few decades, there has been a
surge of research on the development and analysis of the computational methods for
solving VIs. Perhaps this interest lies in the strong interplay between the VIs and the
formulation of optimization and equilibrium problems arising in many communication
and networking problems [38]. Korpelevich’s celebrated extragradient method [24] and
its extensions [18, 7, 15, 8, 14, 49] were developed which require weaker assumptions
than their gradient counterparts. In the past decade, there has been a trending
interest in addressing VIs in the stochastic regimes. Among these, Jiang and Xu
[16] developed the stochastic approximation methods for solving VIs with strongly
monotone and smooth mappings. This work was later extended to the case with
merely monotone mappings [25, 19] and nonsmooth mappings [48].
Algorithm 1.1 The existing SR scheme for solving problem (PfVI) when f :=
1
2‖ · ‖2
1: Input: Set X, mapping F , and an initial regularization parameter η0 > 0.
2: for t = 0, 1, . . . do
3: Compute x∗ηt defined as x
∗
ηt ∈ SOL (X,F + ηtIn).
4: Update ηt to ηt+1 such that ηt+1 < ηt.
5: end for
Despite much advances in the theory and algorithms for VIs, solving the
problem (PfVI) has remained challenging. To the best of our knowledge, the
computational complexity of the existing solution methods for addressing (PfVI) is
unknown. In addressing the standard constrained optimization problems,
Lagrangian duality and relaxation rules have often proven to be very successful [6].
However, when it comes to solving (PfVI), the duality theory cannot be practically
employed. This is primarily because unlike in the standard constrained optimization
problems where the objective function provides a metric for distinguishing solutions,
there is no immediate analog in the VI problems. Inspired by the contributions of
Andrey Tikhonov in 1980s on addressing illposed optimization problems, the
existing methods for solving (PfVI) share in common a sequential regularization (SR)
scheme presented by Algorithm 1.1. The SR scheme is a two-loop framework where
at each iteration, given a fixed parameter ηt, a regularized VI denoted by
VI (X,F + ηtIn) is required to be solved. In the special case where f(x) :=
1
2‖x‖2, it
can be shown when ηt → 0, under the monotonicity of the mapping F and
closedness and convexity of the set X, any limit point of the Tikhonov trajectory
denoted by {x∗ηt}, where x∗ηt ∈ SOL (X,F + ηtIn), converges to the least `2–norm
vector in SOL(X,F ) (cf. Chapter 12 in [12]). The SR approach is associated with
two main drawbacks: (i) It is a computationally inefficient scheme, as it requires
solving a series of increasingly more difficult VI problems. (ii) The iteration
complexity of the SR scheme in addressing the problem (PfVI) is unknown.
Accordingly, the main goal in this work lies in the development of an efficient scheme
equipped with computational complexity analysis for solving the problem (PfVI).
1.3. Summary of contributions. Our main contributions are as follows:
(i) Development of a single timescale method equipped with convergence rate
guarantees: In addressing (PfVI), we develop an efficient first-order method called
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averaging randomized block iteratively regularized gradient (aRB-IRG). The
proposed method is single timescale in the sense that, unlike the SR approach, it
does not require solving a VI at each iteration. Instead, it only uses evaluations of
the mapping F and the subgradient of the objective function f at each iteration. In
the first part of the paper, we consider the case where the set X is bounded. We let
f be a subdifferentiable merely convex function and F be a monotone mapping. In
Theorem 3.3, we derive a suboptimality convergence rate in terms of the mean of
the objective function values. We also derive a convergence rate for the infeasibility
that is characterized by the mean of a dual gap function. In the second part of the
paper, we consider the case where the set X is unbounded and f is smooth and
strongly convex. Utilizing the properties of the Tikhonov trajectory, we establish the
global convergence of the scheme in an almost sure and a mean sense. To the best of
our knowledge, this work appears to be the first paper that provides the two rate
statements for problems of the form (PfVI). In particular, the complexity analysis in
this work improves the results in several previous papers
including [45, 25, 19, 48, 22, 50]. Moreover, in the special case where the VI
constraints represent the optimal solution set of an optimization problem, (PfVI)
captures a class of bilevel optimization problems. This class of problems has been
studied in a number recent papers in deterministic [42, 5, 36, 13], stochastic [3], and
distributed regimes [47]. However, the complexity analysis in the aforementioned
papers lacks a suboptimality rate, or lacks an infeasibility rate, or requires much
stronger assumptions such as strong convexity and smoothness of f .
(ii) Advancing the convergence rate properties of the randomized block-coordinate
schemes: Block-coordinate schemes, and specifically their randomized variants, have
been widely studied in addressing the standard optimization problems (e.g., see
[29, 33, 40, 11, 49]). However, in addressing VI problems, there are only a handful of
recent papers, including [26, 49], that employ this technique and are equipped with
rate guarantees. The aforementioned papers address standard VI problems that can
be viewed a special case of the model (PfVI) where f(x) := 0. In this work, we
extend the convergence and rate analysis of the randomized block-coordinate
schemes to the much broader regime of optimization problems with CVI constraints.
Outline of the paper: The paper is organized as follows. The proposed
algorithm is presented in section 2. The complexity analysis is provided in section 3.
In section 4, we provide the convergence analysis when the set X is unbounded. The
experimental results are in section 5, and the conclusions follow in section 6.
Notation and preliminary definitions: Throughout, a vector x ∈ Rn is
assumed to be a column vector and xT denotes the transpose of x. We use
x(i) ∈ Rni to denote the ith block-coordinate of vector x where x = (x(1); . . . ;x(d))
and
∑d
i=1 ni = n. The Euclidean norm of a vector x is denoted by ‖x‖, i.e.,
‖x‖ ,
√
xTx. For a mapping F : Rn → Rn, we denote the ith block-coordinate of F
by Fi : Rn → Rni , i.e., F (x) = (F1(x); . . . ;Fd(x)). A mapping F : Rn → Rn is said
to be monotone on a convex set X ⊆ Rn if for any x, y ∈ X, we have
(F (x)− F (y))T (x− y) ≥ 0. The mapping F is said to be µ–strongly monotone on a
convex set X ⊆ Rn if µ > 0 and for any x, y ∈ X, we have
(F (x) − F (y))T (x − y) ≥ µ‖x − y‖2. Also, F is said to be Lipschitz with parameter
L > 0 on the set X if for any x, y ∈ X, we have ‖F (x) − F (y)‖ ≤ L‖x − y‖. A
continuously differentiable function f : Rn → R is called µ–strongly convex on a
convex set X if f(x) ≥ f(y) +∇f(y)T (x− y) + µ2 ‖x− y‖2. Function f is µ–strongly
convex if and only if ∇f is µ–strongly monotone on X. For a convex function f with
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the domain dom(f), the subgradient of f at x ∈ dom(f) is denoted by ∇˜f(x) and it
satisfies f(x) + ∇˜f(x)T (y − x) ≤ f(y) for all y ∈ dom(f). The subdifferential set of
f at x is the set of all subgradients of f at x and is denoted by ∂f(x). The
Euclidean projection of vector s onto a convex set S is denoted by PS(s), where
PS(s) , argminy∈S ‖s − y‖. We use In to denote the identity matrix of size n × n.
The probability of an event Z is denoted by Prob(Z) and the expectation of a
random variable z is denoted by E[z]. We use Rn+ and Rn++ to denote
{x ∈ Rn | x ≥ 0} and {x ∈ Rn | x > 0}, respectively.
2. Outline of the algorithm. In this section, we state the main assumptions
and present the proposed scheme for solving the optimization problem (PfVI).
Assumption 2.1. Consider the problem (PfVI) under the following conditions:
(a) The set Xi is nonempty, closed, and convex for all i = 1, . . . , d.
(b) The function f is convex and has bounded subgradients over the set X.
(c) The mapping F : Rn → Rn is continuous, monotone, and bounded over the set X.
(d) The optimal solution set of problem (PfVI) in nonempty.
Under Assumption 2.1(b), we address a broad class of problems of the form (PfVI)
where the objective function is possibly nondifferentiable and nonstrongly convex. In
the following, we discuss the conditions under which Assumption 2.1(d) is satisfied.
Remark 2.2 (Existence of an optimal solution). Suppose Assumption 2.1(a), (b),
and (c) hold. The existence of an optimal solution to the problem (PfVI) can be
established under different conditions. We provide two instances as follows: (i)
Suppose there exits a vector x¯ ∈ X such that the set
X¯ , {x ∈ X : F (x)T (x− x¯) ≤ 0} is bounded. Then, from Proposition 2.2.3 in [12],
SOL(X,F ) is nonempty and compact. Consequently, the Weierstrass’ Theorem
implies the existence of an optimal solution to the problem (PfVI). (ii) Suppose the
set X is compact. Then, from Corollary 2.2.5 in [12], the set SOL(X,F ) is nonempty
and compact. Again, Assumption 2.1(d) is guaranteed by the Weierstrass’ Theorem.
Throughout, we let CF > 0 denote the bound on the Euclidean norm of the mapping
F , i.e., ‖F (x)‖ ≤ CF for all x ∈ X. Also, we let Cf > 0 denote the bound on the
norm of the subgradients of f , i.e., ‖∇˜f(x)‖ ≤ Cf for all ∇˜f(x) ∈ ∂f(x) and x ∈ X.
The outline of the proposed method is presented by Algorithm 2.1. At iteration k, a
block-coordinate index ik is selected randomly as follows:
Assumption 2.3 (Block-coordinate selection rule). At each iteration k ≥ 0,
the random variable ik is generated from an independent and identically distributed
discrete probability distribution such that Prob (ik = i) = pi where pi > 0 for i ∈
{1, . . . , d} and ∑di=1 pi = 1.
Then, the ithk block-coordinate of the iterate xk is updated using (2.1). Here, γk
denotes the stepsize at iteration k and ηk denotes the regularization parameter at
iteration k. We note that these sequences are updated iteratively. Here, we
incorporate the the information of the mapping F and the subgradient mapping ∇˜f
by employing an iterative regularization scheme. We will show that the convergence
and rate analysis of the proposed method mainly rely on the choices of {γk} and
{ηk}. Accordingly, one key research objective in this section will center around the
development of suitable update rules for the two sequences so that we can establish
the convergence and derive rate statements. To obtain the rate results, we employ
an averaging step using the equations given by (2.2), where the sequence {x¯k} is
A METHOD WITH COMPLEXITY FOR OPTIMIZATION WITH VI CONSTRAINTS 7
Algorithm 2.1 aRB-IRG
1: Input: A random initial point x0 ∈ X, x¯0 := x0, initial stepsize γ0 > 0, initial
regularization parameter η0 > 0, a scalar 0 ≤ r < 1, and S0 := γr0 .
2: for k = 0, 1, . . . do
3: Generate a realization of random variable ik according to Assumption 2.3.
4: Evaluate Fik(xk) and ∇˜ikf(xk) where ∇˜f(xk) ∈ ∂f(xk).
5: Update xk as follows:
x
(i)
k+1 :=
{
PXik
(
x
(ik)
k − γk
(
Fik (xk) + ηk∇˜ikf (xk)
))
if i = ik,
x
(i)
k if i 6= ik.
(2.1)
6: Obtain γk+1 and ηk+1 (cf. Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 4.11 for the update rules).
7: Update the averaged iterate x¯k as follows:
Sk+1 := Sk + γ
r
k+1, x¯k+1 :=
Skx¯k + γ
r
k+1xk+1
Sk+1
.(2.2)
8: end for
obtained as a weighted average of {xk}. The averaging weights are characterized by
the stepsize γk and a scalar r ∈ R. It will be shown that the rate results can be
provided when 0 ≤ r < 1 (cf. Theorem 3.3). Importantly, unlike Algorithm 1.1,
Algorithm 2.1 is a single timescale scheme that does not require solving any
inner-level problems.
2.1. Preliminaries. In the following, we provide some definitions and
preliminary results that will be used to analyze the convergence of Algorithm 2.1.
Definition 2.4 (Distance function). For any x, y ∈ Rn, function D(x, y) is
defined as D(x, y) ,∑di=1 p−1i ∥∥x(i) − y(i)∥∥ 2, where pi is given by Assumption 2.3.
Remark 2.5. Under Assumption 2.3, we can relate the distance function D with
the `2–norm as follows: pminD(x, y) ≤ ‖x − y‖2 ≤ pmaxD(x, y) for all x, y ∈ Rn,
where pmin , min1≤i≤d{pi} and pmax , max1≤i≤d{pi}.
One of the main challenges with regard to the convergence analysis of computational
methods for solving VI problems lies in the lack of access to a standard metric to
quantify the quality of the solution iterates. Note that this is in contrast with
solving the standard optimization problems where the objective function can serve
as an immediate performance metric for the underlying algorithm. Addressing this
challenge in the literature of VI problems has led to the study of so-called gap
functions (cf. [12, 48]). Of these, in the analysis of this section, we use the dual gap
function defined as follows:
Definition 2.6 (The dual gap function [28]). Let a nonempty closed set X ⊆ Rn
and a mapping F : X → Rn be given. Then, for any x ∈ X, the dual gap function
GAP : X → R ∪ {+∞} is defined as GAP(x) , supy∈X F (y)T (x− y).
Remark 2.7. Note that when SOL(X,F ) 6= ∅ and F is monotone, we can obtain
from Definition 2.6 that the dual gap function is nonnegative over X. It is also
known that when F is continuous and monotone and the set X is closed and convex,
GAP(x∗) = 0 if and only if x∗ ∈ SOL(X,F ) (cf. [18]). Thus, we conclude that under
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Assumption 2.1, the dual gap function is well-defined.
Definition 2.8 (Regularized mapping). Given a vector x ∈ X, a subgradient
∇˜f(x) ∈ ∂f(x), and an integer k ≥ 0, the regularized mapping Gk : X → R is defined
as Gk(x) , F (x) + ηk∇˜f(x). The ith block of Gk is denoted by Gk,i.
Definition 2.9 (History of the method). Throughout, we let the history of the
algorithm to be denoted by Fk , {x0, i0, i1, . . . , ik−1} for k ≥ 1, with F0 , {x0}.
Next, we show that x¯k generated by Algorithm 2.1 is a well-defined weighted average.
Lemma 2.10 (Weighted averaging). Let {x¯k} be generated by Algorithm 2.1. Let
us define the weights λk,N , γ
r
k∑N
j=0 γ
r
j
for k ∈ {0, . . . , N} and N ≥ 0. Then, for any
N ≥ 0, we have x¯N =
∑N
k=0 λk,Nxk. Also, when X is a convex set, we have x¯N ∈ X.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
In the following, we define two terms that characterize the error between the true
maps with their randomized block variants.
Definition 2.11 (Randomized block error terms). Let Ei ∈ Rn×ni for i =
1, . . . , d be the collection of matrices such that In = [E1, . . . ,Ed] ∈ Rn×n. Consider
the following definitions for k ≥ 0:
∆k , F (xk)− p−1ik EikFik(xk), δk , ∇˜f(xk)− p−1ik Eik∇˜ikf(xk).(2.3)
Lemma 2.12 (Properties of ∆k and δk). Consider Definition 2.11. We have:
(a) E[∆k | Fk] = E[δk | Fk] = 0.
(b) E
[‖∆k‖2 | Fk] ≤ (p−1min − 1)C2F and E[‖δk‖2 | Fk] ≤ (p−1min − 1)C2f .
Proof. See Appendix A.3
We will use the next result in deriving the suboptimality and infeasibility rate results.
Lemma 2.13 (Bounds on the harmonic series). Let 0 ≤ α < 1 be a given scalar.
Then, for any integer N ≥ 2 11−α − 1, we have: (N+1)1−α2(1−α) ≤
∑N
k=0
1
(k+1)α ≤ (N+1)
1−α
1−α .
Proof. See Appendix A.4
3. Convergence rate analysis. In the following result, we derive an inequality
that will be later used to construct bounds on the objective function value and the
dual gap function at the averaged sequence generated by Algorithm 2.1.
Lemma 3.1. Consider the sequence {xk} in Algorithm 2.1. Suppose {γk} and
{ηk} are strictly positive sequences. Let Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 2.3 hold.
Let the auxiliary sequence {uk} ⊂ X be defined as uk+1 , PX (uk + γk (∆k + ηkδk)),
where u0 ∈ X is an arbitrary vector. Then, for any arbitrary y ∈ X and all k ≥ 0,
the following inequality holds:
γrkF (y)
T (xk − y) + γrkηk∇˜f(xk)T (xk − y) ≤
γr−1k
2
(D (xk, y) + ‖uk − y‖2)
− γ
r−1
k
2
(D (xk+1, y) + ‖uk+1 − y‖2)+ γrk(uk − xk)T (∆k + ηkδk)
+ γr+1k
(‖∆k‖2 + η2k‖δk‖2)+ 0.5p−1ik γ1+rk ‖Gk,ik (xk)‖ 2 .(3.1)
Proof. Let k ≥ 1 be fixed. From Definition 2.4 and (2.1), for any y ∈ X, we have:
D (xk+1, y) = p−1ik
∥∥∥x(ik)k+1 − y(ik)∥∥∥ 2 + d∑
i=1, i 6=ik
p−1i
∥∥∥x(i)k − y(i)∥∥∥ 2 .(3.2)
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Next, we find a bound on the term
∥∥∥x(ik)k+1 − y(ik)∥∥∥ 2. From the block structure of
X, we have y(ik) ∈ Xik . Invoking the nonexpansiveness property of the projection
mapping, the update rule (2.1), Definition 2.8, and the preceding relation, we obtain:∥∥∥x(ik)k+1 − y(ik)∥∥∥ 2 ≤ ∥∥∥x(ik)k − γkGk,ik (xk)− y(ik)∥∥∥ 2 .
Combining the preceding relation with (3.2), we obtain:
D (xk+1, y) ≤
d∑
i=1, i 6=ik
p−1i
∥∥∥x(i)k − y(i)∥∥∥ 2 + p−1ik ∥∥∥x(ik)k − y(ik)∥∥∥ 2
− 2 p−1ik γk
(
x
(ik)
k − y(ik)
)T
Gk,ik (xk) + p
−1
ik
γ2k ‖Gk,ik (xk)‖ 2 .
Invoking Definition 2.4 again, we obtain:
D (xk+1, y) ≤ D (xk, y)− 2 p−1ik γk
(
x
(ik)
k − y(ik)
)T
Gk,ik (xk) + p
−1
ik
γ2k ‖Gk,ik (xk)‖ 2 .
(3.3)
From Definition 2.11 and Definition 2.8, we can write:
p−1ik
(
x
(ik)
k − y(ik)
)T
Gk,ik (xk) = p
−1
ik
(xk − y)T (EikGk,ik (xk))
= p−1ik (xk − y)T
(
EikFik(xk) + ηkEik∇˜ikf (xk)
)
= (xk − y)T (Gk(xk) + ∆k + ηkδk) .
Combining the preceding inequality and relation (3.3), we obtain:
D (xk+1, y) ≤ D (xk, y)− 2γk(xk − y)T (Gk(xk) + ∆k + ηkδk) + p−1ik γ2k ‖Gk,ik (xk)‖
2
.
(3.4)
Consider the definition of the auxiliary sequence {uk} in Lemma 3.1. Invoking the
nonexpansiveness property of the projection again, we can obtain:
‖uk+1 − y‖2 ≤ ‖uk + γk (∆k + ηkδk)− y‖2
= ‖uk − y‖2 + 2γk(uk − y)T (∆k + ηkδk) + γ2k‖∆k + ηkδk‖2.
Thus, we have:
‖uk+1 − y‖2 ≤ ‖uk − y‖2 + 2γk(uk − y)T (∆k + ηkδk) + 2γ2k‖∆k‖2 + 2γ2kη2k‖δk‖2.
Adding the preceding inequality and the inequality (3.4) together, we obtain:
2γk(xk − y)TGk(xk) ≤
(D (xk, y) + ‖uk − y‖2)− (D (xk+1, y) + ‖uk+1 − y‖2)
+ 2γk(uk − xk)T (∆k + ηkδk) + 2γ2k
(‖∆k‖2 + η2k‖δk‖2)+ p−1ik γ2k ‖Gk,ik (xk)‖ 2 .(3.5)
From the monotonicity property of the mapping F and Definition 2.8, we have:
(xk − y)TGk(xk) ≥ (xk − y)TF (y) + ηk∇˜f(xk)T (xk − y).
This provides a lower bound on the left-hand side of (3.5). The inequality (3.1) is
obtained by substituting this bound in (3.5) and multiplying both sides by
γr−1k
2 .
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In the following, we develop upper bounds for suboptimality and infeasibility of
the weighted average iterate generated by Algorithm 2.1. Both of these error bounds
are characterized in terms of the stepsize and the regularization parameter.
Proposition 3.2 (Error bounds for Algorithm 2.1). Let the sequence {x¯k} be
generated by Algorithm 2.1. Suppose {γk} and {ηk} are strictly positive and
nonincreasing sequences. Let Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 2.3 hold. Moreover,
assume the set X is bounded, i.e., ‖X‖ ≤M for all x ∈ X and some M > 0.
(a) Let x∗ be an optimal solution to problem (PfVI). Then, for any N ≥ 1:
E[f (x¯N )]− f(x∗) ≤
4M2γr−1N
ηN
+
∑N
k=0 η
−1
k γ
r+1
k
(
C2F + η
2
kC
2
f
)
pmin
∑N
k=0 γ
r
k
.(3.6)
(b) Consider the dual gap function in Definition 2.6. Then, for any N ≥ 1:
E[GAP (x¯N )] ≤
4M2γr−1N +
∑N
k=0 γ
r
k
(
2pminηkCfM + γkC
2
F + γkη
2
kC
2
f
)
pmin
∑N
k=0 γ
r
k
.(3.7)
Proof. We define the following terms for all k ≥ 0, that appear in (3.1):
Θk,1 , γrk(uk − xk)T (∆k + ηkδk) , Θk,2 , γr+1k
(‖∆k‖2 + η2k‖δk‖2) ,
Θk,3 , 0.5p−1ik γ
1+r
k ‖Gk,ik (xk)‖ 2 .(3.8)
Next, we estimate the expected values of these terms. Recall Fk given by
Definition 2.9. Note that xk is Fk–measurable. Also, from the definition of uk in
Lemma 3.1, uk is Fk–measurable. Note, however, that Θk,j is Fk+1–measurable for
all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Taking these into account and using the total probability law, for
any k ≥ 0 and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we have: E[Θk,j ] = EFk [Eik [Θk,j | Fk]]. From this
relation and Lemma 2.12, we have for any k ≥ 0:
E[Θk,1] = 0, E[Θk,2] =
(
p−1min − 1
)
γr+1k
(
C2F + η
2
kC
2
f
)
.(3.9)
Also, using Definition 2.8 and the triangle inequality, we can write:
E[Θk,3] =
d∑
i=1
pi
(
0.5p−1i γ
1+r
k ‖Gk,i (xk)‖ 2
)
≤ γ1+rk
d∑
i=1
(
‖Fi(xk)‖2 + η2k‖∇˜if(xk)‖2
)
= γ1+rk ‖F (xk)‖2 + η2k‖∇˜f(xk)‖2 ≤ γ1+rk
(
C2F + η
2
kC
2
f
)
.
(3.10)
We are now ready to show the inequalities (3.6) and (3.7) as follows:
(a) Consider (3.1). From the definition of subgradients of the convex function f , we
have that f(xk)− f(y) ≤ ∇˜f(xk)T (xk − y). Thus, we obtain for any y ∈ X:
γrkF (y)
T (xk − y) + γrkηk (f(xk)− f(y)) ≤
γr−1k
2
(D (xk, y) + ‖uk − y‖2)
− γ
r−1
k
2
(D (xk+1, y) + ‖uk+1 − y‖2)+ Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3.
Let us substitute y := x∗, where x∗ denotes an optimal solution to (PfVI). Note that
x∗ must be a feasible solution to (PfVI), i.e., F (x
∗)T (xk − x∗) ≥ 0. Thus, we obtain:
γrkηk (f(xk)− f(x∗)) ≤
γr−1k
2
(D (xk, x∗) + ‖uk − x∗‖2)
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− γ
r−1
k
2
(D (xk+1, x∗) + ‖uk+1 − x∗‖2)+ Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3.(3.11)
Dividing both sides by ηk and adding and subtracting
γr−1k−1
2ηk−1
(
D (xk, x∗) + ‖uk − x∗‖2
)
in the right-hand side of (3.11), we obtain for k ≥ 1:
γrk (f(xk)− f(x∗)) ≤
γr−1k−1
2ηk−1
(
D (xk, x∗) + ‖uk − x∗‖2
)
− γ
r−1
k
2ηk
(
D (xk+1, x∗) + ‖uk+1 − x∗‖2
)
+
1
2
(
γr−1k
ηk
− γ
r−1
k−1
ηk−1
)(
D (xk, x∗) + ‖uk − x∗‖2
)
+ η−1k (Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3) .
(3.12)
Since r − 1 < 0 and that {γk} and {ηk} are nonincreasing, we have γ
r−1
k
ηk
− γ
r−1
k−1
ηk−1
≥ 0.
Also, from the boundedness of the set X, since xk, x
∗, and u belong to X, using
Remark 2.5 and the triangle inequality, we have:
D (xk, x∗) + ‖uk − x∗‖2 ≤ p−1min ‖xk − x∗‖2 + ‖uk − x∗‖2 ≤ 4M2
(
p−1min + 1
) ≤ 8M2
pmin
.
(3.13)
Summing over (3.12) from k = 1 to N and using (3.13), we obtain:
N∑
k=1
γrk (f(xk)− f(x∗)) ≤
γr−10
2η0
(
D (x1, x∗) + ‖u1 − x∗‖2
)
+ 4M2p−1min
(
γr−1N
ηN
− γ
r−1
0
η0
)
+
N∑
k=1
η−1k (Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3) ,
where we drop the nonpositive term. From relation (3.11) when k = 0, we have:
γr0 (f(x0)− f(x∗)) ≤
γr−10
2η0
(D (x0, x∗) + ‖u0 − x∗‖2)
− γ
r−1
0
2η0
(D (x1, x∗) + ‖u1 − x∗‖2)+ η−10 (Θ0,1 + Θ0,2 + Θ0,3) .
Adding the last two inequalities, from Lemma 2.10 and convexity of f , we obtain:(
N∑
k=0
γrk
)
(f (x¯N )− f(x∗)) ≤ γ
r−1
0
2η0
(
D (x0, x∗) + ‖u0 − x∗‖2
)
+ 4M2p−1min
(
γr−1N
ηN
− γ
r−1
0
η0
)
+
N∑
k=0
η−1k (Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3) .
Taking the expectation on both sides and invoking (3.13), we obtain:
E[f (x¯N )]− f(x∗) ≤
4M2p−1minγ
r−1
N
ηN
+
∑N
k=0 η
−1
k E[Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3]∑N
k=0 γ
r
k
.
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From the relations (3.9) and (3.10), we obtain:
E[f (x¯N )]− f(x∗) ≤
4M2p−1minγ
r−1
N
ηN
+
∑N
k=0 η
−1
k
(
p−1minγ
r+1
k
(
C2F + η
2
kC
2
f
))
∑N
k=0 γ
r
k
,
which implies the inequality (3.6).
(b) From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the definitions of Cf and M , and the triangle
inequality, we have ∇˜f(xk)T (y − xk) ≤
∥∥∥∇˜f(xk)∥∥∥ ‖xk − y‖ ≤ 2CfM. Adding the
preceding inequality with the relation (3.1), we obtain:
γrkF (y)
T (xk − y) ≤ γ
r−1
k
2
(D (xk, y) + ‖uk − y‖2)
− γ
r−1
k
2
(D (xk+1, y) + ‖uk+1 − y‖2)+ 2γrkηkCfM + Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3.(3.14)
Adding and subtracting the term
γr−1k−1
2
(
D (xk, y) + ‖uk − y‖2
)
, we obtain:
γrkF (y)
T (xk − y) ≤
γr−1k−1
2
(
D (xk, y) + ‖uk − y‖2
)
− γ
r−1
k
2
(
D (xk+1, y) + ‖uk+1 − y‖2
)
+
1
2
(
γr−1k − γr−1k−1
) (D (xk, y) + ‖uk − y‖2)
+ 2γrkηkCfM + Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3.
Substituting the bound given by (3.13) in the preceding relation, we obtain:
γrkF (y)
T (xk − y) ≤
γr−1k−1
2
(
D (xk, y) + ‖uk − y‖2
)
− γ
r−1
k
2
(
D (xk+1, y) + ‖uk+1 − y‖2
)
+ 4M2p−1min
(
γr−1k − γr−1k−1
)
+ 2γrkηkCfM + Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3.
Summing both sides from k = 1 to N , we obtain:
N∑
k=1
γrkF (y)
T (xk − y) ≤ γ
r−1
0
2
(
D (x1, y) + ‖u1 − y‖2
)
+ 4M2p−1min
(
γr−1N − γr−10
)
+
N∑
k=1
(2γrkηkCfM + Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3) .(3.15)
Writing the inequality (3.14) for k = 0, we have:
γr0F (y)
T (x0 − y) ≤ γ
r−1
0
2
(D (x0, y) + ‖u0 − y‖2)− γr−10
2
(D (x1, y) + ‖u1 − y‖2)
+ 2γr0η0CfM + Θ0,1 + Θ0,2 + Θ0,3.(3.16)
Adding (3.15) and (3.16) together, we obtain:
N∑
k=0
γrkF (y)
T (xk − y) ≤ γ
r−1
0
2
(
D (x0, y) + ‖u0 − y‖2
)
+ 4M2p−1min
(
γr−1N − γr−10
)
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+
N∑
k=0
(2γrkηkCfM + Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3) .(3.17)
Recalling x¯N =
∑N
k=0 λk,Nxk in Lemma 2.10, applying the bound given by (3.13),
and using the triangle inequality, we obtain:(
N∑
k=0
γrk
)
F (y)T (x¯N − y) ≤4M2p−1minγr−1N +
N∑
k=0
(2γrkηkCfM + Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3) .
Taking the supremum with respect to y over the setX from the left-hand side, invoking
Definition 2.6, and then dividing both sides by
∑N
k=0 γ
r
k, we obtain:
GAP (x¯N ) ≤ 4M
2p−1minγ
r−1
N +
∑N
k=0 (2γ
r
kηkCfM + Θk,1 + Θk,2 + Θk,3)∑N
k=0 γ
r
k
.
Taking the expectation on both sides, using the relations (3.9) and (3.10), and
rearranging the terms, we obtain the inequality (3.7).
We are now ready to present the convergence rate results of the proposed method.
Theorem 3.3 (Convergence rate statements for Algorithm 2.1). Consider
Algorithm 2.1. Let Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 2.3 hold and assume the set X
is bounded such that ‖x‖ ≤ M for all x ∈ X and some M > 0. Suppose for k ≥ 0,
γk :=
γ0√
k+1
and ηk :=
η0
(k+1)b
, where γ0 > 0, η0 > 0, and 0 < b < 0.5. Then, for any
0 ≤ r < 1, the following results hold:
(i) Let x∗ be an optimal solution to the problem (PfVI). Then, for any N ≥ 2
2
1−r − 1:
E[f (x¯N )]− f(x∗) ≤ 2− r
pminη0
4M2
γ0
+
γ0
(
C2F + η
2
0C
2
f
)
0.5− 0.5r + b
 1
(N + 1)0.5−b
.(3.18)
(ii) Consider the dual gap function in Definition 2.6. Then, for any N ≥ 2 21−r − 1:
E[GAP (x¯N )] ≤ 2− r
pmin
4M2
γ0
+
γ0
(
C2F + η
2
0C
2
f
)
0.5− 0.5r +
2pminCfMη0
1− 0.5r − b
 1
(N + 1)b
.
(3.19)
Proof. Let us define the following terms:
ΛN,1 , pmin
N∑
k=0
γrk, ΛN,2 ,
4M2γr−1N
ηN
, ΛN,3 ,
(
C2F + η
2
0C
2
f
) N∑
k=0
η−1k γ
r+1
k ,
ΛN,4 , 4M2γr−1N , ΛN,5 ,
(
C2F + η
2
0C
2
f
) N∑
k=0
γr+1k , ΛN,6 , 2pminCfM
N∑
k=0
ηkγ
r
k.
Note that from (3.6) and (3.7), we have:
E[f (x¯N )]− f(x∗) ≤ ΛN,2 + ΛN,3
ΛN,1
, E[GAP (x¯N )] ≤ ΛN,4 + ΛN,5 + ΛN,6
ΛN,1
.(3.20)
14 H. D. KAUSHIK AND F. YOUSEFIAN
Next, we apply Lemma 2.13 to estimate the terms ΛN,i. Substituting γk and ηk by
their update rules, we obtain:
ΛN,1 = pmin
N∑
k=0
γr0
(k + 1)0.5r
≥ pminγ
r
0(N + 1)
1−0.5r
2(1− 0.5r) ,
ΛN,2 =
4M2(N + 1)0.5(1−r)+b
η0γ
1−r
0
, ΛN,4 =
4M2(N + 1)0.5(1−r)
γ1−r0
,
ΛN,3 =
N∑
k=0
(
C2F + η
2
0C
2
f
)
γ1+r0
η0(k + 1)0.5(1+r)−b
≤
γ1+r0
(
C2F + η
2
0C
2
f
)
(N + 1)1−0.5(1+r)+b
η0(1− 0.5(1 + r) + b) ,
ΛN,5 =
(
C2F + η
2
0C
2
f
) N∑
k=0
γr+10
(k + 1)0.5(1+r)
≤
(
C2F + η
2
0C
2
f
)
γr+10 (N + 1)
1−0.5(1+r)
1− 0.5(1 + r) ,
ΛN,6 = 2pminCfMη0γ
r
0
N∑
k=0
1
(k + 1)0.5r+b
≤ 2pminCfMη0γ
r
0(N + 1)
1−0.5r−b
1− 0.5r − b .
For these inequalities to hold, we need to ensure that conditions of Lemma 2.13
are met. Accordingly, we must have 0 ≤ 0.5r < 1, 0 ≤ 0.5(1 + r) − b < 1, 0 ≤
0.5r + b < 1, and 0 ≤ 0.5(1 + r) < 1. These relations hold because 0 ≤ r < 1
and 0 < b < 0.5. Another set of conditions when applying Lemma 2.13 includes
N ≥ max{21/(1−0.5r), 21/(1−0.5(1+r)+b), 21/(1−0.5r−b), 21/(1−0.5(1+r))} − 1. Note that
this condition is satisfied as a consequence of N ≥ 2 21−r −1, b > 0, and 0 ≤ r < 1. We
conclude that all the necessary conditions for applying Lemma 2.13 and obtaining the
aforementioned bounds for the terms ΛN,i are satisfied. To show that the inequalities
(3.18) and (3.19) hold, it suffices to substitute the preceding bounds of the terms ΛN,i
into the two inequalities given by (3.20). The details are as follows:
E[f (x¯N )]− f(x∗) ≤ ΛN,2 + ΛN,3
ΛN,1
=
2− r
pminγr0(N + 1)
1−0.5r
(
4M2(N + 1)0.5−0.5r+b
η0γ
1−r
0
+
(
γ1+r0
η0
) (C2F + η20C2f) (N + 1)0.5−0.5r+b
0.5− 0.5r + b
 .
The inequality (3.18) is obtained by rearranging the terms in the preceding relation.
E[GAP (x¯N )] ≤ ΛN,4 + ΛN,5 + ΛN,6
ΛN,1
≤ 2− r
pminγr0(N + 1)
1−0.5r
(
4M2(N + 1)0.5−0.5r
γ1−r0
+
(
C2F + η
2
0C
2
f
)
γr+10 (N + 1)
0.5−0.5r
0.5− 0.5r +
2pminCfMη0γ
r
0(N + 1)
1−0.5r−b
1− 0.5r − b
 .
Then, (3.19) can be obtained by rearranging the terms in the preceding inequality.
Remark 3.4 (Iteration complexity of Algorithm 2.1). As an immediate result
from Theorem 3.3, choosing γk :=
γ0√
k+1
and ηk :=
η0
4√k+1 , we obtain
E[f (x¯N )− f(x∗)] + E[GAP (x¯N )] = O
(
4
√
N
)
. This implies that Algorithm 2.1
achieves an iteration complexity of O (4) in solving the problem (PfVI).
A METHOD WITH COMPLEXITY FOR OPTIMIZATION WITH VI CONSTRAINTS 15
4. Addressing the case where X is unbounded. The convergence and rate
statements provided by Theorem 3.3 require the set X to be bounded. We, however,
note that in some applications, e.g., in the models presented in Example 1.4 and
Example 1.5, this assumption may not hold. Accordingly, in this section, our aim is
to analyze the convergence of Algorithm 2.1 when X is unbounded. To this end, we
consider the following main assumption:
Assumption 4.1. Consider problem (PfVI) under the following conditions:
(a) The set Xi is nonempty, closed, and convex for all i = 1, . . . , d.
(b) The function f is continuously differentiable and µf–strongly convex over X.
(c) The mapping F : Rn → Rn is continuous and monotone over X.
(d) The solution set SOL(X,F ) in nonempty.
Remark 4.2 (Existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution). Under
Assumption 4.1, the constraint set of (PfVI), i.e., SOL(X,F ), is nonempty, closed,
and convex. The convexity of this set is implied by Theorem 2.3.5 in [12] and its
closedness property is obtained by the continuity of the mapping F and closedness
of the set X. Because in the problem (PfVI), the objective function f is strongly
convex and that the constraint set is nonempty, closed, and convex, from
Proposition 1.1.2 in [6], we conclude that the problem (PfVI) has a unique optimal
solution. Throughout this section, we let x∗ denote this unique optimal solution.
4.1. Preliminaries. In this part, we provide some preliminary results that will
be used in the convergence analysis. We begin by defining a generalized Tikhonov
trajectory that is associated with the problem of interest in this paper.
Definition 4.3 (Tikhonov trajectory). Consider the problem (PfVI) under
Assumption 4.1. Let {ηk} be a sequence of strictly positive scalars and x∗ηk ∈ X
denote the unique solution to the regularized variational inequality problem given by
VI (X,F + ηk∇f). Then, the sequence
{
x∗ηk
}
is defined as the Tikhonov trajectory
associated with the problem (PfVI).
Remark 4.4. The uniqueness of the solution of VI (X,F + ηk∇f) in Definition 4.3
is due to the strong monotonicity of the mapping F + ηk∇f and closedness and
convexity of the set X (see Theorem 2.3.3 in [12]). Definition 4.3 generalizes the
notion of Tikhonov trajectory provided in [12] in the following way: in [12], x∗ηk is
defined as the solution to the regularized problem VI (X,F + ηkIn). This is indeed
the special case where we choose f(x) := 12‖x‖2 in Definition 4.3.
To analyze the convergence, we utilize the properties of the Tikhonov trajectory. The
following result ascertains the asymptotic convergence of the trajectory to the optimal
solution of the problem (PfVI). It also provides an upper bound on the error between
any two successive vectors of the trajectory.
Lemma 4.5. Consider Definition 4.3 and let Assumption 4.1 hold. Let {ηk} be a
nonincreasing sequence such that limk→∞ ηk = 0 and ηk > 0 for all k ≥ 0. Then:
(a) The Tikhonov trajectory {x∗ηk} converges to a unique limit point, that is x∗.
(b) There exists C¯f > 0 such that
∥∥∥x∗ηk − x∗ηk−1∥∥∥ ≤ C¯fµf ∣∣∣1− ηk−1ηk ∣∣∣ for all k ≥ 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The following lemmas will be employed to establish the asymptotic convergence result.
Lemma 4.6 (Theorem 6, page 75 in [23]). Let {ut} ⊂ Rn denote a sequence
of vectors where limt→∞ ut = uˆ. Also, let {αk} denote a sequence of strictly positive
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scalars such that
∑∞
k=0 αk =∞. Suppose vk ∈ Rn is defined by vk ,
∑k−1
t=0 (αtut)∑k−1
t=0 αt
, for
all k ≥ 1. Then lim
k→∞
vk = uˆ.
Lemma 4.7 (Lemma 10, page 49 in [32]). Let {vk} be a sequence of nonnegative
random variables, where E[v0] < ∞, and let {αk} and {βk} be deterministic scalar
sequences such that: E[vk+1|v0, ..., vk] ≤ (1 − αk)vk + βk for all k ≥ 0, 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1,
βk ≥ 0,
∑∞
k=0 αk = ∞,
∑∞
k=0 βk < ∞, limk→∞ βkαk = 0. Then, vk → 0 almost surely
and lim
k→∞
E[vk] = 0.
4.2. Convergence analysis. As a key step toward performing the convergence
analysis for Algorithm 2.1, next we derive a recursive inequality for the distance
between the generated sequence {xk} by the algorithm and the Tikhonov trajectory
{x∗ηk}. To this end, we first make the following assumption:
Assumption 4.8. Consider the problem (PfVI) under the following assumptions:
(a) There exit nonnegative scalars LF , BF such that for all x, y ∈ X:
‖F (x)− F (y)‖2 ≤ L2F ‖x− y‖2 +BF .
(b) The gradient mapping ∇f is Lipschitz with parameter Lf > 0.
Remark 4.9. By allowing LF , BF to take zero values, Assumption 4.8 provides a
unifying structure for considering both smooth and nonsmooth cases. In particular,
when LF = 0, part (a) refers to a bounded, but possibly non-Lipschitzian mapping
F . Also, when BF = 0, part (a) refers to a Lipschitzian, but possibly unbounded
mapping F over the set X.
The following recursive relation will play a key role in establishing the convergence.
Lemma 4.10 (A recursive error bound for Algorithm 2.1). Consider the
sequence {xk} in Algorithm 2.1. Let Assumption 4.1, Assumption 2.3, and
Assumption 4.8 hold. Suppose {γk} and {ηk} are nonincreasing and strictly positive
where limk→∞ ηk = 0, and γkηk ≤
µfpmin
2pmax(L2F+η20L2f)
for all k ≥ 0. Then, for all k ≥ 1:
E
[D (xk+1, x∗ηk) |Fk] ≤pmaxpmin
(
1− pminµfγkηk
2
)
D
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)
+
C¯2f (µfγ0η0 + 2/pmin)
µ3f pminγkηk
(
ηk−1
ηk
− 1
)2
+ 2γ2kBF .(4.1)
Proof. From Definition 2.4, we have:
D (xk+1, x∗ηk) = p−1ik ∥∥∥x(ik)k+1 − x∗(ik)ηk ∥∥∥ 2 + d∑
i=1, i 6=ik
p−1i
∥∥∥x(i)k − x∗(i)ηk ∥∥∥ 2 .(4.2)
Next, we find a bound on the term
∥∥∥x(ik)k+1 − x∗(ik)ηk ∥∥∥ 2. From the properties of the
natural map (see Proposition 1.5.8 in [12]), Definition 2.8, and that x∗ηk ∈ X, we
have x∗ηk = PX
(
x∗ηk − γkGk
(
x∗ηk
))
. From Assumption 4.1(a) and that
x∗ηk ∈ SOL (X,Gk) ⊆ X, we have x∗
(ik)
ηk
∈ Xik . Invoking the nonexpansiveness
property of the projection mapping, (2.1), and the preceding relation, we obtain:∥∥∥x(ik)k+1 − x∗(ik)ηk ∥∥∥ 2 ≤ ∥∥∥x(ik)k − γkGk,ik (xk)− x∗(ik)ηk + γkGk,ik (x∗ηk)∥∥∥ 2 .
A METHOD WITH COMPLEXITY FOR OPTIMIZATION WITH VI CONSTRAINTS 17
Combining the preceding relation with (4.2), we obtain:
D (xk+1, x∗ηk) ≤ d∑
i=1, i 6=ik
p−1i
∥∥∥x(i)k − x∗(i)ηk ∥∥∥ 2 + p−1ik ∥∥∥x(ik)k − x∗(ik)ηk ∥∥∥ 2
− 2 p−1ik γk
(
x
(ik)
k − x∗
(ik)
ηk
)T (
Gk,ik (xk)−Gk,ik
(
x∗ηk
))
+ p−1ik γ
2
k
∥∥Gk,ik (xk)−Gk,ik (x∗ηk)∥∥ 2 .
Invoking Definition 2.4, from the preceding relation we obtain:
D (xk+1, x∗ηk) ≤ D (xk, x∗ηk)− 2 p−1ik γk (x(ik)k − x∗(ik)ηk )T (Gk,ik (xk)−Gk,ik (x∗ηk))
+ p−1ik γ
2
k
∥∥Gk,ik (xk)−Gk,ik (x∗ηk)∥∥ 2 .
Taking the conditional expectation from the both sides of preceding relation and
noting that D (xk, x∗ηk) is Fk–measurable, we obtain the following inequality:
E
[D (xk+1, x∗ηk) |Fk] ≤ D (xk, x∗ηk)+ γ2kE[p−1ik ∥∥Gk,ik (xk)−Gk,ik (x∗ηk)∥∥ 2]
− 2γkE
[
p−1ik
(
x
(ik)
k − x∗
(ik)
ηk
)T (
Gk,ik (xk)−Gk,ik
(
x∗ηk
))]
.(4.3)
Next, we estimate the second and third expectations in the preceding relation:
E
[
p−1ik
(
x
(ik)
k − x∗
(ik)
ηk
)T (
Gk,ik (xk)−Gk,ik
(
x∗ηk
))]
=
d∑
i=1
pip
−1
i
(
x
(i)
k − x∗
(i)
ηk
)T (
Gk,i (xk)−Gk,i
(
x∗ηk
))
=
(
xk − x∗ηk
)T (
Gk(xk)−Gk
(
x∗ηk
))
.(4.4)
We can also write:
E
[
p−1ik
∥∥Gk,ik (xk)−Gk,ik (x∗ηk)∥∥ 2]
=
d∑
i=1
pip
−1
i
∥∥Gk,i (xk)−Gk,i (x∗ηk)∥∥ 2 = ∥∥Gk (xk)−Gk (x∗ηk)∥∥ 2 .(4.5)
From Assumption 4.8, taking into account that Gk is (ηkµf )–strongly monotone, and
combining (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5) we obtain:
E
[D (xk+1, x∗ηk) |Fk] ≤ D (xk, x∗ηk)− 2µfγkηk ∥∥xk − x∗ηk∥∥2
+ 2γ2k
((
L2F + η
2
kL
2
f
) ∥∥xk − x∗ηk∥∥2 +BF) .
From Remark 2.5, we obtain:
E
[D (xk+1, x∗ηk) |Fk] ≤ (1− 2µfγkηkpmin + 2γ2kpmax (L2F + η2kL2f))D (xk, x∗ηk)
+ 2γ2kBF .
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From the assumption γk ≤ µfηkpmin2pmax(L2F+η20L2f) and the preceding inequality, we obtain:
E
[D (xk+1, x∗ηk) |Fk] ≤ (1− µfγkηkpmin)D (xk, x∗ηk)+ 2γ2kBF .(4.6)
The preceding relation is not yet fully recursive as the term x∗ηk must change to x
∗
ηk−1
on the right-hand side. Next, we find an upper bound for D (xk, x∗ηk) in terms of
D
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)
. Note that we have ‖u + v‖2 ≤ (1 + θ)‖u‖2 + (1 + 1θ ) ‖v‖2 for any
vectors u, v ∈ Rn and θ > 0. Utilizing this inequality, by setting u :=
∥∥∥xk − x∗ηk−1∥∥∥ 2,
v :=
∥∥∥x∗ηk−1 − x∗ηk∥∥∥ 2, and θ := pminµfγkηk2 we obtain:∥∥xk − x∗ηk∥∥ 2 ≤ (1 + pminµfγkηk2 )∥∥∥xk − x∗ηk−1∥∥∥ 2
+
(
1 +
2
pminµfγkηk
)∥∥∥x∗ηk−1 − x∗ηk∥∥∥ 2 .
Together with Lemma 4.5(b) and Remark 2.5, we have:
pminD
(
xk, x
∗
ηk
) ≤ (1 + pminµfγkηk
2
)
pmaxD
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)
+
(
1 +
2
pminµfγkηk
)
C¯2f
µ2f
(
1− ηk−1
ηk
)2
.
Dividing both sides by pmin and substituting this in (4.6), we obtain:
E
[D (xk+1, x∗ηk) |Fk] ≤ pmaxpmin (1− γkηkµfpmin)
(
1 +
pminµfγkηk
2
)
D
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)
+
C¯2f
µ2f pmin
(
1 +
2
pminµfγkηk
)(
1− ηk−1
ηk
)2
+ 2γ2kBF .
(4.1) is obtained by noting that (1− γkηkµfpmin)
(
1 +
pminµfγkηk
2
) ≤ 1− pminµfγkηk2 .
In the following result, we provide a class of update rules for the stepsize and
the regularization sequences such that Algorithm 2.1 attains both an almost sure
convergence and a convergence in the mean sense.
Theorem 4.11 (Convergence of Algorithm 2.1 when X is unbounded). Consider
(PfVI). Let the sequence {xk} be generated by Algorithm 2.1. Let Assumption 4.1,
Assumption 2.3, and Assumption 4.8 hold. Suppose the random block-coordinate ik
in Assumption 2.3 is drawn from a uniform distribution. Let the stepsize {γk} and
the regularization parameter {ηk} be given by γk := γ0(k+1)−a and ηk := η0(k+1)−b,
respectively, where γ0 > 0, η0 > 0 and a and b satisfy 0 < b < 0.5 < a and a+ b < 1.
Then, the following results hold:
(i) The sequence {x¯k} converges almost surely to the unique optimal solution of (PfVI).
(ii) We have that limk→∞ E[‖x¯k − x∗‖] = 0.
Proof. The proof is done in two main steps. In the first step, we show that
the non-averaged sequence {xk} converges to x∗ in an almost sure sense and that
limk→∞ E[‖xk − x∗‖] = 0. In the second step, we show that these results hold for the
weighted average sequence {x¯k} as well.
Step 1: The proof of this step is done by applying Lemma 4.7 to the recursive
inequality (4.1) with pi :=
1
d for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. The details are as follows. First,
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we note that from the update rules of γk and ηk and that a > b, we have
limk→∞ γkηk = 0. Thus, there exits an integer k0 ≥ 1 such that for all k ≥ k0, we have
γk
ηk
≤ µfpmin
2pmax(L2F+η20L2f)
. This implies that the conditions of Lemma 4.10 are satisfied
and the inequality (4.1) holds for all k ≥ k0. To apply Lemma 4.7, we define the
following terms for all k ≥ 0:
vk , D
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)
, αk ,
µfγkηk
2d
,
βk ,
(
dC¯2f (µfη0γ0 + 2d)
µ3fγkηk
)(
ηk−1
ηk
− 1
)2
+ 2γ2kBF .
Since γkηk → 0, there exits an integer k1 ≥ k0 such that for any k ≥ k1 we have
0 ≤ αk ≤ 1. From the assumption that a+ b < 1, we have that
∑∞
k=k1
αk =∞. Next,
we show that
∑∞
k=k1
βk < ∞. From the update rules of γk and ηk and invoking the
Taylor series expansion, for k ≥ 2 we can write:
ηk−1
ηk
− 1 =
(
1 +
1
k
)b
− 1 =
(
1 +
b
k
+
b(b− 1)
2!
1
k2
+
b(b− 1)(b− 2)
3!
1
k3
+ ...
)
− 1
=
b
k
(
1− (1− b)
2!k
+
(1− b)(2− b)
3!k2
− (1− b)(2− b)(3− b)
4!k3
+ ...
)
≤ b
k
∞∑
i=0
1
k2i
,
where the inequality is obtained using b < 1 and neglecting the negative terms. This
implies that ηk−1ηk − 1 ≤ bk(1−k−2) and thus
(
ηk−1
ηk
− 1
)2
≤ ( 4b3k)2 ≤ 2b2k2 for all k ≥ 2.
From the definition of βk and the update formulas of γk and ηk, we have that
βk = O
(
k−(2−a−b)
)
+ O (k−2a). From the assumptions on a and b, we obtain that∑∞
k=k1
βk < ∞. Also, from the assumption a > b, we get limk→∞ βk/αk = 0.
Therefore, all conditions of Lemma 4.7 are satisfied. As such, we have that
D
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)
goes to 0 almost surely and also limk→∞ E
[
D
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)]
= 0. From
Remark 2.5 and that ik is drawn uniformly, we obtain:
‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ 2
∥∥∥xk − x∗ηk−1∥∥∥2 + 2 ∥∥∥x∗ηk−1 − x∗∥∥∥2
=
2
d
D
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)
+ 2
∥∥∥x∗ηk−1 − x∗∥∥∥2 ,(4.7)
where the first inequality is obtained from the triangle inequality. Taking the limit
from both sides of the preceding relation when k → ∞ and invoking Lemma 4.5(a),
we obtain limk→∞ ‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ 2d limk→∞D
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)
. From the almost sure
convergence of D
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)
to zero, we conclude that xk converges to x
∗ almost
surely. To show the convergence in mean, let us take the expectation from both
sides of (4.7). Noting that the Tikhonov trajectory is deterministic, we obtain that
E
[
‖xk − x∗‖2
]
≤ 2dE
[
D
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)]
+ 2
∥∥∥x∗ηk−1 − x∗∥∥∥2. Now, taking the limit from
both sides of the preceding relation when k → ∞, invoking Lemma 4.5(a), and
recalling limk→∞ E
[
D
(
xk, x
∗
ηk−1
)]
= 0, we conclude that
limk→∞ E
[
‖xk − x∗‖2
]
= 0. Invoking the Jensen’s inequality, we can conclude that
limk→∞ E[‖xk − x∗‖] = 0.
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Step 2: Invoking Lemma 2.10 and using the triangle inequality, we have:
‖x¯k − x∗‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥
k∑
t=0
λt,kxt − x∗
∥∥∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥
k∑
t=0
λt,k (xt − x∗)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
k∑
t=0
λt,k ‖xt − x∗‖ .(4.8)
In view of Lemma 4.6, let us define ut , ‖xt − x∗‖, vt ,
∑k
t=0 λt,k ‖xt − x∗‖, and
αt , γrt . Since ar ≤ 1, we have
∑∞
t=0 αt =
∑∞
t=0(t+1)
−ar =∞. Note that from Step
1, we have that uˆ , limt→∞ ut = 0 in an almost sure sense. Thus, from Lemma 4.6,
we conclude that vt converges to zero almost surely. Thus, (4.8) implies that {x¯k}
converges to x∗ almost surely. Next, we apply Lemma 4.6 in a different fashion to
show that limk→∞ E[‖x¯k − x∗‖] = 0. From (4.8) we have:
E[‖x¯k − x∗‖] ≤ E
[
k∑
t=0
λt,k ‖xt − x∗‖
]
=
k∑
t=0
λt,kE[‖xt − x∗‖] .(4.9)
In view of Lemma 4.6, let us define ut , E[‖xt − x∗‖], vt ,
∑k
t=0 λt,kE[‖xt − x∗‖],
and αt , γrt . First, we show that uˆ , limt→∞ ut = 0. Adding and subtracting x∗ηt−1
on the right-hand side of ut = E[‖xt − x∗‖], we have:
ut ≤ E
[∥∥∥xt − x∗ηt−1∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥x∗ηt−1 − x∗∥∥∥] = E[∥∥∥xt − x∗ηt−1∥∥∥]+ ∥∥∥x∗ηt−1 − x∗∥∥∥ .
Step 1 implies that limk→∞ E[‖xk − x∗‖] = 0, while Lemma 4.5(a) implies that
limt→∞
∥∥∥x∗ηt−1 − x∗∥∥∥ = 0. Thus, from the preceding inequality, we obtain
uˆ , limt→∞ ut = 0. Therefore, in view of Lemma 4.6, we have
limt→∞ vt ,
∑k
t=0 λt,kE[‖xt − x∗‖] = 0. Thus, from (4.9), we conclude that
limt→∞ E[‖x¯k − x∗‖]. Hence, the proof is completed.
5. Experimental results. In this section, we revisit the problem of finding the
best Nash equilibrium formulated as in (1.1). We consider a case where the Nash
game is characterized as a Cournot competition over a network. Cournot game is
one of the most extensively studied economic models for competition among multiple
firms, including imperfectly competitive power markets as well as rate control over
communication networks [17, 19, 12]. Consider a collection of d firms who compete
to sell a commodity over a network with J nodes. The decision of each firm i ∈
{1, . . . , d} includes variables yij and sij , denoting the generation and sales of the firm
i at the node j, respectively. Considering the definitions yi , (yi1; . . . ; yiJ) and
si , (si1; . . . ; siJ), we can compactly denote the decision variable of the ith firm as
x(i) , (yi; si) ∈ R2J . The goal of the ith firm lies in minimizing the net cost function
gi
(
x(i), x(−i)
)
over the network defined as follows:
gi
(
x(i), x(−i)
)
,
J∑
j=1
cij(yij)−
J∑
j=1
sijpj (s¯j) ,
where cij : R → R denotes the production cost function of the firm i at the node
j, s¯j ,
∑d
i=1 sij denotes the aggregate sales from all the firms at the node j, and
pj : R→ R denotes the price function with respect to the aggregate sales s¯j at the node
j. We assume that the cost functions are linear and the price functions are given as
pj (s¯j) , αj − βj (s¯j)σ where σ ≥ 1 and αj and βj are positive scalars. Throughout,
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Fig. 1: Algorithm 2.1 in terms of infeasibility and the objective function value
we assume that the transportation costs are negligible. We let the generation be
capacitated as yij ≤ Bij , where Bij is a positive scalar for i ∈ {1, . . . , d} and j ∈
{1, . . . , J}. Lastly, for any firm i, the total sales must match with the total generation.
Consequently, the strategy set of the firm i is given as follows:
Xi ,
(yi; si) |
J∑
j=1
yij =
J∑
j=1
sij , yij , sij ≥ 0, yij ≤ Bij , for all j = 1, . . . , J
 .
Following the model (1.1), we employ the Marshallian aggregate surplus function
defined as f(x) ,
∑d
i=1 gi
(
x(i);x(−i)
)
. We note that the convexity of the function f
is implied by σ ≥ 1 and the monotonicity of mapping F is guaranteed when either
σ = 1, or when 1 < σ ≤ 3 and d ≤ 3σ−1σ−1 (cf. section 4 in [19]).
The set-up: In the experiment, we consider a Cournot game among 4 firms over 3
nodes. We let the slopes of the linear cost functions take values between 10 and 50. We
assume that αj := 50 and βj := 0.05 for all j, Bij := 120 for all i and j, and σ := 1.01.
To report the performance of Algorithm 2.1 in terms of the suboptimality, we plot a
sample average approximation of E[f (x¯N )] using the sample size of 25. With regard
to the infeasibility, we compute a sample average approximation of E[GAP (x¯N )] using
the same sample size. Following Remark 3.4, we use γk :=
γ0√
k+1
and ηk :=
η0
4√k+1 . To
select the block-coordinates in Algorithm 2.1, we use a discrete uniform distribution.
Results and insights: Figure 1 shows the experimental results. Here, in the
top three figures, we compare the performance of Algorithm 2.1 with that of
Algorithm 1.1 in terms of infeasibility measured by the sample averaged gap
function. Importantly, the proposed algorithm performs significantly better than the
SR scheme. This claim is supported by considering the different values of the
parameter r and the initial conditions of the proposed scheme in terms of the initial
stepsize γ0 and the initial regularization parameter η0. The three figures in the
bottom row of Figure 1 demonstrate the performance of Algorithm 2.1 in terms of
22 H. D. KAUSHIK AND F. YOUSEFIAN
reaching a stability in the objective values. This includes the Marshallian objective
function f as well as the individual objective functions gi. Note that all the
objective values in Figure 1 appear to reach to a desired level of stability after
around 60 seconds. This interesting observation can be indeed linked to the impact
of the averaging scheme (2.2). Generally, it is expected that the trajectories of the
objective function values in Figure 1 be subject to a noise due to the randomness in
the block-coordinate selection rule. However, the weighted averaging scheme
employed in Algorithm 2.1 appears to induce much robustness with respect to this
uncertainty, resulting in an accelerated convergence for the proposed algorithm.
6. Conclusions. Motivated by the applications arising from noncooperative
multi-agent networks, we consider a class of optimization problems with Cartesian
variational inequality (CVI) constraints. The computational complexity of the
solution methods for addressing this class of problems appears to be unknown. We
develop a single timescale algorithm equipped with non-asymptotic suboptimality
and infeasibility convergence rates. Moreover, in the case where the set associated
with the CVI is unbounded, we establish the global convergence of the sequence
generated by the proposed algorithm. We apply the method in finding the best Nash
equilibrium in a networked Cournot competition. Our experimental results show
that the proposed method outperforms the classical sequential regularized schemes.
Appendix A. Additional proofs.
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1.3. Let us define the function φ : Rn → R as φ(x) ,
1
2‖Ax−b‖2+ 12
∑J
j=1 (max{0, hj(x)})2. We first note that φ is a differentiable function
such that ∇φ(x) = F (x) where F is given by Lemma 1.3 (e.g., see page 380 in [6]).
Next, we also note that φ is convex. To see this, note that from the convexity of
hj(x), the function h
+
j (x) , max{0, hj(x)} is convex. Then, the function
(
h+j (x)
)2
can be viewed as a composition of s(u) , u2 for u ∈ R and the convex function
h+j . Since h
+
j is nonnegative on its domain and s(u) is nondecreasing on [0,+∞),
we have that
(
h+j (x)
)2
is a convex function. As such, φ is a convex function as well.
Consequently, from the first-order optimality conditions for convex programs, we have
SOL(X,F ) = argminx∈X φ(x). To show the desired equivalence between problems
(PfVI) and (1.2), it suffices to show that X = argminx∈X φ(x) where X denotes the
feasible set of problem (1.2). To show this statement, first we let x¯ ∈ X . Then, from
the definition of φ(x), we have φ(x¯) = 0. This implies that x¯ ∈ argminx∈X φ(x).
Thus, we have X ⊆ argminx∈X φ(x). Second, let x˜ ∈ argminx∈X φ(x). The feasibility
assumption of the set X implies that there exits an x0 ∈ X such that Ax0 = b and
hj(x0) ≤ 0 for all j. This implies that φ(x0) = 0. From the nonnegativity of φ and
that x˜ ∈ argminx∈X φ(x), we must have φ(x˜) = 0 and x˜ ∈ X. Therefore, we obtain
Ax˜ = b, hj(x˜) ≤ 0 for all j, and x˜ ∈ X. Thus, we have argminx∈X φ(x) ⊆ X . Hence,
we conclude that X = argminx∈X φ(x) = SOL(X,F ) and the proof is completed.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2.10. We use induction to show that
x¯N =
∑N
k=0 λk,Nxk for any N ≥ 0. For N = 0, the relation holds due to the
initialization x¯0 := x0 in Algorithm 2.1 and that λ0,0 = 1. Next, let the relation hold
for some N ≥ 0. From (2.2) and noting that SN =
∑N
k=0 γ
r
k for all N ≥ 0, we can
write:
x¯N+1 =
SN x¯N + γ
r
N+1xN+1
SN+1
=
∑N+1
k=0 γ
r
kxk∑N+1
k=0 γ
r
k
=
N+1∑
k=0
λk,N+1xk,
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implying that the induction hypothesis holds for N + 1. Thus, we conclude that the
desired averaging formula holds for N ≥ 0. To complete the proof, note that since∑N
k=0 λk,N = 1, under the convexity of the set X, we have x¯N ∈ X.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2.12. (a) From Definition 2.11, we can write:
E[∆k | Fk] = F (xk)−
d∑
i=1
pip
−1
i EiFi(xk) = F (xk)−
d∑
i=1
EiFi(xk) = 0.
The relation E[δk | Fk] = 0 can be shown in a similar fashion.
(b) We can write:
E
[‖∆k‖2 | Fk] = d∑
i=1
pi
∥∥F (xk)− p−1i EiFi(xk)∥∥2
=
d∑
i=1
pi
(
‖F (xk)‖2 + p−2i ‖EiFi(xk)‖2 − 2p−1i F (xk)TEiFi(xk)
)
= ‖F (xk)‖2 +
d∑
i=1
p−1i ‖EiFi(xk)‖2 − 2
d∑
i=1
‖Fi(xk)‖2 ≤
(
p−1min − 1
)
C2F .
The relation E
[‖δk‖2 | Fk] ≤ (p−1min − 1)C2f can be shown using a similar approach.
A.4. Proof of Lemma 2.13. Given 0 ≤ α < 1, let us define the function
φ : R++ → R as φ(x) , x−α for all x > 0. Since α > 0, the function φ is nonincreasing.
We can write:
N∑
k=0
1
(k + 1)α
= 1 +
N+1∑
k=2
1
kα
≤ 1 +
∫ N+1
1
dx
xα
= 1 +
(N + 1)1−α − 1
1− α ≤
(N + 1)1−α
1− α ,
implying the desired upper bound. To show that the lower bound holds, we can write:
N∑
k=0
1
(k + 1)α
=
N+1∑
k=1
1
kα
≥
∫ N+2
1
dx
xα
≥
∫ N+1
1
dx
xα
≥ (N + 1)
1−α − 0.5(N + 1)1−α
1− α ,
where the last inequality is obtained using the assumption that N ≥ 2 11−α − 1.
Therefore, the desired lower bound holds as well. This completes the proof.
A.5. Proof of Lemma 4.5. (a) From the definition of x∗ and x∗ηk (cf.
Definition 4.3), we have that:
F (x∗)T (x− x∗) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X,(A.1) (
F
(
x∗ηk
)
+ ηk∇f
(
x∗ηk
))T (
y − x∗ηk
) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X.(A.2)
For x := x∗ηk and y := x
∗, adding the resulting two relations together, we obtain:
ηk∇f
(
x∗ηk
)T (
x∗ − x∗ηk
) ≥ (F (x∗)− F (x∗ηk))T (x∗ − x∗ηk) .
From the monotonicity of the mapping F and the preceding relation, we obtain that
∇f (x∗ηk)T (x∗ − x∗ηk) ≥ 0. Also, from the strong convexity of f , we have:
f(x∗) ≥ f (x∗ηk)+∇f (x∗ηk)T (x∗ − x∗ηk)+ µf2 ∥∥x∗ − x∗ηk∥∥2 .
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From the preceding relations, we have
f(x∗) ≥ f (x∗ηk)+ µf2 ∥∥x∗ − x∗ηk∥∥2 for all k ≥ 0.(A.3)
Recall that from Remark 4.2, under Assumption 4.1, x∗ ∈ X and x∗ηk ∈ X both exist
and are unique. From the continuity of f over the set X, we have that
f(x∗) − f (x∗ηk) < ∞. Thus, (A.3) implies that {x∗ηk} is a bounded sequence.
Therefore, it must have at least one limit point. Let {x∗ηk}k∈K be an arbitrary
subsequence such that limk→∞, k∈K x∗ηk = xˆ. We show that xˆ ∈ SOL(X,F ). Taking
the limit from both sides of (A.2) with respect to the aforementioned subsequence
and using the continuity of mappings F and ∇f , we obtain that for all y ∈ X,
(F (xˆ) + limk→∞, k∈K ηk∇f (xˆ))T (y − xˆ) ≥ 0. Note that the mapping ∇f (xˆ) is
bounded. This is because xˆ ∈ X (due to the closedness of X) and that ∇f is
continuous on the set X. Therefore, from the preceding inequality, we obtain that
F (xˆ)
T
(y − xˆ) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X, implying that xˆ ∈ SOL(X,F ) and so xˆ is a feasible
solution to the problem (PfVI). Next, we show that xˆ is the optimal solution to
(PfVI). From (A.3), continuity of f , and neglecting the term
µf
2
∥∥x∗ − x∗ηk∥∥2, we
obtain f (x∗) ≥ f (limk→∞, k∈K x∗ηk) = f(xˆ). Hence, from the uniqueness of x∗, all
the limit points of {x∗ηk} fall in the singleton {x∗} and the proof is completed.
(b) If x∗ηk = x
∗
ηk−1 , the desired relation holds. Suppose for k ≥ 1, we have x∗ηk 6= x∗ηk−1 .
From x∗ηk−1 ∈ SOL (X,F + ηk−1∇f) and x∗ηk ∈ SOL (X,F + ηk∇f), we have that:(
F
(
x∗ηk−1
)
+ ηk−1∇f
(
x∗ηk−1
))T (
x− x∗ηk−1
)
≥ 0 for all x ∈ X,(
F
(
x∗ηk
)
+ ηk∇f
(
x∗ηk
))T (
y − x∗ηk
) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X.
Adding the resulting two relations together, for x := x∗ηk and y := x
∗
ηk−1 we have:(
−F (x∗ηk)− ηk∇f (x∗ηk)+ F (x∗ηk−1) + ηk−1∇f (x∗ηk−1))T (x∗ηk − x∗ηk−1) ≥ 0.
The monotonicity of F implies that
(
F
(
x∗ηk
)− F (x∗ηk−1))T (x∗ηk − x∗ηk−1) ≥ 0.
Adding this relation to the preceding inequality, we have:(
ηk∇f
(
x∗ηk
)− ηk−1∇f (x∗ηk−1))T (x∗ηk−1 − x∗ηk) ≥ 0.
Adding and subtracting the term ηk∇f
(
x∗ηk−1
)T (
x∗ηk−1 − x∗ηk
)
, we obtain:
(ηk − ηk−1)∇f
(
x∗ηk−1
)T (
x∗ηk−1 − x∗ηk
)
≥
ηk
(
∇f
(
x∗ηk−1
)
−∇f (x∗ηk))T (x∗ηk−1 − x∗ηk) .(A.4)
From the strong convexity of function f , we have:(
∇f
(
x∗ηk−1
)
−∇f (x∗ηk))T (x∗ηk−1 − x∗ηk) ≥ µf ∥∥∥x∗ηk − x∗ηk−1∥∥∥2 .(A.5)
From (A.4) and (A.5), we can write:
(ηk − ηk−1)∇f
(
x∗ηk−1
)T (
x∗ηk−1 − x∗ηk
)
≥ ηkµf
∥∥∥x∗ηk − x∗ηk−1∥∥∥2 .
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Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain:
|ηk − ηk−1|
∥∥∥∇f (x∗ηk−1)∥∥∥∥∥∥x∗ηk−1 − x∗ηk∥∥∥ ≥ ηkµf ∥∥∥x∗ηk − x∗ηk−1∥∥∥2 ,
Since x∗ηk 6= x∗ηk−1 , dividing the both sides by ηk
∥∥∥x∗ηk − x∗ηk−1∥∥∥, we obtain:∣∣∣∣1− ηk−1ηk
∣∣∣∣ ∥∥∥∇f (x∗ηk−1)∥∥∥ ≥ µf ∥∥∥x∗ηk − x∗ηk−1∥∥∥ .(A.6)
From part (a), the trajectory {x∗ηk} is bounded. Also, for any k ≥ 0, x∗ηk ∈ X by the
definition. Since X is closed, there exists a compact set S ⊆ X such that {x∗ηk} ⊂ S.
This statement and the continuity of ∇f imply that there exits C¯f > 0 such that∥∥∥∇f (x∗ηk−1)∥∥∥ ≤ C¯f for all k ≥ 1. Thus, from (A.6), we obtain the desired inequality.
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